
















State University of New York, Albany 
 
Colletta H. Moser 










Chapter 14 (pp. 301-322) in: 
Of Heart and Mind: Social Policy Essays in Honor of Sar A. Levitan 
Garth L. Mangum, and Stephen Mangum, eds. 




Copyright ©1996. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
CHAPTER 14
Welfare Reform
Lessons from the JOBS Program
Irene Lurie 
Colletta Moser
For three decades, Sar Levitan chronicled and analyzed efforts to 
reduce poverty and reform the welfare system, particularly through 
employment and training programs. From one of his earlier publica 
tions on the topic, Work and Welfare Go Together (with Martha Rein 
and David Marwick 1972 and 1976) through one more recent, Jobs for 
JOBS: Toward a Work Based Welfare System (with Frank Gallo 1993), 
Sar Levitan emphasized the symbiotic relationship between poverty 
reduction, welfare reform, and employment.
The Current Context
Today, the federal government is once again considering a major 
reform of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro 
gram, one that would make more fundamental changes than any 
reforms enacted since passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. After 
campaigning on a promise to "end welfare as we know it," President 
Clinton proposed legislation that would move toward imposing a two- 
year time limit on a family's eligibility for AFDC payments. After the 
Republicans captured control of the 104th Congress, leaders in both 
houses sought not only to impose time limits but to transform the open- 
ended federal matching grants that help finance state AFDC payments 
into block grants that would cap federal payments to the states and give 
them wider discretion in designing their AFDC programs. Meanwhile,
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at least half of the states have seized the initiative to reform their wel 
fare programs by requesting waivers from federal law, and the Clinton 
administration has approved many of these waivers and signaled its 
openness to new approaches.
What has brought us to the brink of scrapping the arrangement of 
sixty years and moving toward time limits, block grants and, thereby, 
an end to welfare as a statutory entitlement for many poor families? 
Why is the nation considering reforms that Sar Levitan, as both scholar 
and humanitarian, would have undoubtedly deplored? Certainly, 
pledges by both the President and Congress to rein in the federal bud 
get deficit have motivated their proposals to reform the welfare system, 
while governors argue that welfare costs are a heavy burden on state 
finances. But in actuality, federal expenditures for AFDC accounted for 
only 1 percent of all federal outlays in 1993 and state expenditures for 
the program comprised an average of only 3.2 percent of total state 
expenditures in 1994 (National Association of State Budget Officers 
1995, p. 87). Additional factors beyond the financial burden of welfare 
expenditures must explain the draconian changes being considered by 
Congress and implemented by some of the states.
From our observations of recent events, we see three sets of addi 
tional explanations for the current focus on welfare reform. One set of 
explanations can be detected in the changing values about the role of 
women in the labor force and about the responsibility of parents for the 
support of themselves and their children. A second set can be found in 
the apparent inability of government to implement programs that sig 
nificantly increase the work effort and earning capacity of welfare 
recipients and decrease welfare dependency and costs. The newest wel 
fare employment program, enacted with great fanfare in 1988, is in 
many respects an improvement over previous programs, but was not 
given the chance to fulfil its promise. Finally, it is clear that political 
actors stand to gain by taking a tough, visible stance toward welfare 
reform and that even largely symbolic actions serve a useful political 
function, perhaps more useful than the financially costly and adminis 
tratively difficult tasks involved in program implementation.
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Methodology
The primary basis for these conclusions is a study of the implemen 
tation of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) pro 
gram created by the Family Support Act of 1988. The implementation 
study followed the progress of ten states as they moved through suc 
cessive stages of developing their programs. It focused on the design 
and structure of the JOBS program, on the processing of individuals 
through the program, and on the resulting changes in the opportunities 
for recipients and in the demands placed upon them. No attempt was 
made to measure the effects of the JOBS program in reducing welfare 
dependency and costs or in increasing participants' earnings. 1 The 
study's primary question was not "Is the JOBS program effective?" but 
"What is the JOBS program?" The ten states, chosen to be broadly rep 
resentative of the nation and illustrative of a range of state experience 
in implementing JOBS, include Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis 
sissippi, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and 
Texas. 2 To examine the implementation of JOBS at the front lines, 
three local sites were selected in each of the ten states: a large urban 
area, a mid-sized city, and a small or rural community.
The methodology for the study was field network research, an 
approach used by Richard Nathan (1982) and others to examine the 
responses of states and localities to other federal initiatives. The essen 
tial feature of this approach is a network of policy analysts in each state 
who collect and analyze information using a common instrument and 
then report their jurisdictions' responses in a uniform format. The first 
round of field research was conducted soon after the mandatory imple 
mentation date of October 1990, the second round during the summer 
of 1991, and the third round during the summer of 1992; the field asso 
ciates updated their findings during 1994 or 1995. 3
This paper begins with a review of the changing values underlying 
the progression of employment programs for AFDC recipients that 
began in 1967. It then briefly highlights some of the major lessons 
about implementing welfare employment programs reached by the ten- 
state study. After taking this broad view, we focus on Michigan, which 
served as a leader in rousing the wave of sentiment that encouraged the 
Clinton administration to recommend time- limited welfare benefits
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and approve the states' requests for waivers from federal law, and that 
served as a model for Republicans in the 104th Congress as they 
pressed for welfare block grants and an end to the welfare entitlement.
Changing Values
The Social Security Act of 1935, which created the ADC program, 
was written with the expectation that mothers would stay home with 
their children, and it consequently did nothing to encourage mothers to 
work. Few mothers with young children were in the workforce and "a 
mother's place is in the home" was the dominant value. Anticipating 
that the typical ADC mother would be a widow and that the ADC pro 
gram would wither away as coverage for survivors expanded with the 
maturation of the Social Security system, the Act's framers gave rela 
tively little thought to the ADC program's design, much less to the 
issue of mothers' employment. In addition, the high jobless rate during 
the Great Depression years did not make employment appear to be a 
promising source of income for people with little work experience, 
particularly mothers burdened with the care of young children.
By the 1960s, when the nation next focused attention on the plight 
of the poor, several important changes had occurred. While most wid 
ows were covered by Social Security, as had been expected, the case 
load continued to grow as the number of divorced, separated, or never- 
married mothers increased and the number of poor, female-headed 
families rose. The expectation that mothers would stay home to care 
for their children faded as the labor force participation of women rose, 
increasing from 27 percent in 1940 to 58.8 percent in 1994, with a 
much more dramatic increase among married women with children, 
especially those with children under the age of six. With middle-class 
mothers going off to work and a strong economy generating new jobs, 
employment became a more feasible alternative to welfare than it had 
been during the 1930s. As a result of these developments, in 1967 Con 
gress required that all states operate an employment and training pro 
gram for AFDC recipients, the Work Incentive (WIN) program. In 
1971, as AFDC caseloads continued to mushroom, Congress mandated
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states to impose a work test that required recipients to register with the 
WIN program and accept offers of suitable employment.
Despite the WIN program and the work test, the number of families 
headed by single mothers and the AFDC caseload continued to rise. 
When Reagan became president, his determination to halt this trend led 
to the enactment of federal legislation that gave states several new 
options for encouraging welfare recipients to work. The Reagan years 
were also notable for a shift in attitudes among both conservatives and 
liberals concerning the role of government in assisting the poor. In the 
wake of harsh criticism of welfare programs, many political leaders, 
policy analysts, and scholars argued that government should place 
greater demands on single parents (Murray 1984; Mead 1986). Gov 
ernment has an obligation to give financial assistance to poor parents, 
they argued, but parents have an obligation to help themselves become 
economically self-sufficient (National Governors' Association 1987). 
The idea that welfare involves a set of mutual obligations gained popu 
larity both in statehouses and Congress. With the support of the 
National Governors' Association and its chairman, Governor Bill Clin 
ton, Congress sought to put this idea into place with the Family Sup 
port Act of 1988.
The Family Support Act was hailed as landmark legislation that rep 
resented a new consensus on the nature of the "social contract" 
between government and welfare recipients. As Senator Moynihan, a 
chief architect of the legislation, described the contract: "Congress laid 
down a set of mutual obligations. Society owed single mothers support 
while they acquired the means of self-sufficiency; mothers owed soci 
ety the effort to become self- sufficient" (1990, p. Cl). To enable par 
ents to become self-sufficient, the Act eliminated the WIN program and 
created the JOBS program in its place.
The JOBS program is like the WIN program in many respects, but it 
is stronger (1) by providing more federal funding for services and child 
care, (2) by requiring states to offer more types of services, and (3) by 
setting clear goals that states must meet in order to receive their full 
share of federal matching funds. States can provide a wide range of 
services under the JOBS umbrella, including virtually any type of edu 
cation, training, or employment activity available to the general public 
and several work programs designed around the welfare grant. The Act 
emphasizes education by requiring states to offer any educational
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activity below the postsecondary level that is appropriate to a partici 
pant's employment goal. The Act also strengthens the financial incen 
tive for recipients to take a job by continuing to finance their child care 
and Medicaid coverage for a year after they earn enough to become 
ineligible for welfare. But like the AFDC program, the JOBS program 
is a state responsibility, so whether it would lead to significant change 
would depend on its implementation by the states and the agencies 
operating the program at the local level.
Implementing the Jobs Program
Not surprisingly, the field research found that states implemented 
the JOBS program in very diverse ways. Some of these differences 
reflect the criteria for selecting the ten states, while others stem from 
differences in the leadership and philosophy of elected and appointed 
officials, the infrastructure of organizations with capacity to provide 
JOBS services and child care, the organizational "culture" in the wel 
fare agency, the strength of labor markets, and other factors. But the 
field associates also found considerable similarity in certain aspects of 
the states' implementation efforts, patterns that offer explanations for 
the states' waiver initiatives, Clinton's proposal to reform welfare, and 
the congressional Republican's efforts to dismantle the system.
The Mix and Supply of JOBS Services
JOBS implementation was generally incremental, with states build 
ing their programs upon the foundations laid by the WIN program and 
the options introduced in the early 1980s, so that the states' prior expe 
rience in operating these programs set them moving on different paths. 
Six of the study states Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania had fairly well-developed welfare 
employment programs prior to passage of the Family Support Act. 
These states had already charted a course consistent with the federal 
legislation, and they expanded their programs to serve more people and 
to bring a broader range of services into additional areas of the state. 
With the exception of Michigan, which began with incremental
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changes but then dramatically altered the design and organization of its 
program, the federal legislation supported and reinforced the initiatives 
these states had chosen earlier.
Another group of states Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas had 
not taken advantage of the previous federal options to introduce major 
welfare-to-work initiatives. They did not have programs in place that 
could, with minor modifications, meet the requirements of the JOBS 
legislation. Their earlier approach to limiting welfare dependency and 
costs was to maintain low AFDC benefits rather than to operate strong 
employment and training programs. To increase the number of JOBS 
participants, the primary strategy of these states was to draw upon 
existing services that were free of charge to the welfare agency, partic 
ularly the activities financed by the Job Training Partnership Act and 
programs offered by public school systems and community colleges. In 
Texas, the welfare agency used its funding for child care to bargain for 
resources from other organizations.
Despite differences in the magnitude of their efforts, both groups of 
states placed a large share of JOBS participants into educational activi 
ties: adult literacy and other basic education, preparation for the GED 
examination, and both two- and four-year college programs. The focus 
on education reflects the intent of the federal legislation which, for the 
first time, mandated educational services as a major strategy to reduce 
welfare dependency. But the focus on education also indicates the edu 
cational deficits of many AFDC recipients and a recognition of the 
importance of education as an avenue of escape from poverty. Finally, 
educational services were frequently available at no cost to the JOBS 
program, and funding from the education system of some states was 
made available to match federal JOBS funds, compensating for inade 
quate funding from the welfare system.
Job skills training was emphasized in several states, particularly in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, where JTPA was the contractor for JOBS 
services, and in the early days of Michigan's program, where skills 
training was available from both contractors and-the adult education 
system. But the JOBS program was generally not training people for 
jobs that were likely to lift them well out of poverty. Many participants 
were being trained for clerical jobs, health-care related jobs, and other 
service-sector jobs that pay relatively low wages and offer few ladders 
to more lucrative employment.
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In the absence of adequate job opportunities, requiring that welfare 
recipients work has remained an elusive goal of the JOBS program. Yet 
the field research did document some success in placing participants in 
jobs.
Both Oregon and Michigan began their JOBS program with an 
emphasis on education, although even Oregon initially assigned people 
with basic and vocational skills directly to training in job search tech 
niques. After several years of this approach, however, state officials 
changed their program's strategy to emphasize job search as an "up 
front" activity. One rationale for up-front job search is that some recip 
ients already possess the ability and skill to work in available jobs, so 
that job search serves as a screening device to separate people who are 
capable of working from those who need some sort of preparation for 
employment. Using job search in this way to identify "job ready" 
recipients enables the welfare agency to focus its education and train 
ing resources on people who are more disadvantaged. As discussed 
later, Michigan's switch to emphasize job search was one part of an 
ambitious plan by the governor to transform the "culture" of welfare  
not by tinkering with the program design but by altering the gestalt of 
the entire system.
Not only was JOBS implementation incremental in most states, but 
administrators had limited resources for implementing a predetermined 
program model so that the design of the program was somewhat hap 
hazard. Until the Family Support Act, federal legislation gave the states 
no goals regarding the participation of recipients in their WIN pro 
gram, with the result that many people found the program to be little 
more than a paper process of registering for services that were never 
delivered. But the Family Support Act requires states to serve a mini 
mum percent of the people who are required to participate in JOBS: 7 
percent in 1990 and 1991, 11 percent in 1992 and 1993, 15 percent in 
1994, and 20 percent by 1995. 4 These federally mandated participation 
rates drove the implementation effort. State funding for JOBS was lim 
ited, so that few states spent enough to draw down their full share of 
federal JOBS funds, and in Oregon, which did obtain its full share, the 
field associate argued that "under-funding of the entire program is a 
persistent and chronic problem." Because funds for the JOBS program 
were scarce, welfare agencies could not purchase enough education 
and training services to meet the participation rate. To get enough edu-
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cation and training slots, welfare agencies relied upon the programs of 
other organizations, such as public schools, the JTPA, and community 
colleges, for a supply of services. This meant that, in many areas, the 
JOBS program lacked control over the availability of services. The 
people served and the types of services offered were based not just on 
an assessment of each individual's need for services, but on the exist 
ing infrastructure of organizations and programs. So rather than imple 
menting a clear program model, the programs of many states were 
"service-driven," placing recipients in the services that were available. 
Expanding the types and quantity of education, training, and job 
search activities was generally easy when funds were available to pur 
chase these services. Many organizations are willing and even eager to 
serve JOBS participants if they are paid in exchange, including local 
school districts, community colleges, and public, nonprofit, and propri 
etary training organizations. To say it another way, the supply of educa 
tion, training, and employment services is elastic in response to 
increased funding, so that the capacity to deliver services is generally 
not a constraint in operating welfare employment programs. Other 
favorable news from the field research is that the willingness of organi 
zations such as JTPA and the public school systems to supply services 
to JOBS participants free of charge, without payment of JOBS funds, 
was generally good. Interagency coordination of this type is often con 
sidered to be difficult, hindered by turf battles, conflicting agency 
goals, differences in eligibility rules and definitions of terms, and other 
incompatibilities. In the states and sites included in the study, the 
degree of interagency cooperation emerges as one of the success sto 
ries of JOBS implementation. Coordination was not good everywhere, 
but there was progress. The combination of a lack of funds for JOBS 
and the federally mandated participation rate was a powerful motiva 
tion for welfare agencies to develop formal and informal linkages with 
other agencies. Strong state and local leadership was most in evidence 
around issues of interagency coordination. But whether a lot more ser 
vices can be obtained through coordination is an open question.
Administrative Challenges
Other aspects of operating the JOBS program proved more trouble 
some and help explain the impatience and dissatisfaction with the
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approach taken by both WIN and the JOBS program. In particular, the 
prosaic tasks involved in processing recipients through the program are 
difficult for administrators to monitor and control, especially when 
they involve the personal interaction between the caseworker and the 
client. Do caseworkers inform clients about the availability of JOBS 
services with enthusiasm? Do caseworkers have sufficient time to do 
an in-depth assessment of a client's abilities and needs? Do they make 
an effort to learn about the client's real interests and concerns? How 
much effort do they exert to find an appropriate school or training pro 
gram or to locate child care that meets the client's needs? Thinking 
about these tasks are eye-glazing to policy makers and scholars who 
are uninterested in the internal workings of organizations, but whether 
the tasks are performed with energy and commitment or with a paper- 
pushing mentality can make the difference between a successful and 
unsuccessful program.5
A related challenging task was insuring that individuals conform to 
the federal mandate that they participate in the JOBS program. Some 
recipients were highly motivated to participate, but mandating the par 
ticipation of recipients who were not motivated was far from a trivial 
matter. In order to impose a participation requirement, a program needs 
a supply of education, training, and employment services, as well as 
funding for child care. A welfare agency also needs to devote staff to 
monitoring participation and to operating the conciliation and sanc 
tioning process for people who refuse to participate. A fair hearing is 
also a right for people whose benefits are being cut or terminated. The 
field associates found that some caseworkers thought the conciliation 
and sanctioning process was too time-consuming, too much of a has 
sle. They also learned that participation in the JOBS program was in 
practice voluntary in certain states. The high cost in terms of staff time 
connected with mandating participation in welfare employment pro 
grams and requiring that recipients accept suitable employment goes a 
long way in explaining the current popularity of time-limits on welfare 
eligibility.
More generally, the field work indicated an imbalance between our 
expectations for welfare offices and the resources and respect that we 
give caseworkers in welfare agencies. Some framers of the Family 
Support Act argued that JOBS would change the "culture" of welfare 
agencies by shifting the focus of their attention from administering
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welfare benefits to providing employment and training. But the field 
associates found that state and local governments were reluctant to 
budget more money for the staff of their welfare agencies. Even when a 
lack of welfare agency staff was perceived to be the major bottleneck 
in implementing JOBS, governments failed to hire more caseworkers. 
In Michigan, the state welfare agency hired more staff only when the 
state received the Child Care and Development Block Grant and case 
workers could be hired entirely on federal money.
The high cost of child care may be one of the major constraints to 
expanding the JOBS program. Participants could tap into the services 
of other agencies for education, training, and job search, but few other 
funding streams were available for funding child care. The total cost of 
JOBS services was about $1.1 billion in 1992 and 1993. The total cost 
of child care in 1992 was at least $755 million, or almost three-quarters 
as large as the cost of JOBS services.
Finding and creating appropriate job opportunities for participants 
has often proven to be difficult. One JOBS component work supple 
mentation, or grant diversion, where a recipient's benefit is paid to an 
employer as a wage subsidy is a potentially powerful tool for encour 
aging private sector employers to hire welfare recipients. But few sites 
made use of this option: 0.1 percent of participants were in work sup 
plementation. The Family Support Act required that these be "new 
jobs"; employers were reluctant to hire welfare recipients when they 
could hire unemployed people with more recent work experience; they 
did not want to deal with the paperwork of hiring welfare recipients; 
and there may also be stigma attached to people on welfare. The poor 
track record of work supplementation suggests that creating jobs is not 
a simple task. 6
State Welfare Politics: The Case of Michigan
Michigan represented an unusual departure in the study primarily 
because of its dramatic shifts in program emphasis from the human 
capital investment model to the job search/immediate employment 
model. But the real implementation of the change, a program called 
"Work First," did not take place until October 1994 four years after
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we began our study of the JOBS program. Along the way, however, the 
Michigan experience illustrated the power of gubernatorial leadership 
in changing the focus of state welfare programs and setting an example 
for Congress.
Michigan had been one of the states selected for the ten-state study 
as one with considerable experience in operating employment-based 
welfare programs. The welfare/employment program in Michigan at 
the time of the implementation of the federal JOBS program was called 
the MOST program, and it continued to be called the MOST program. 
In fact, in Michigan as in some of the other states, keeping local titles 
for the new JOBS program often meant that even many of the Depart 
ment of Social Services employees didn't realize that a new federal 
program was in place.
In order to put the programmatic changes in perspective, we need to 
examine changes in political leadership and in the economy that 
occurred during this period. With respect to political changes, the most 
significant change was, of course, the election of Governor John 
Engler, a state senator from the central area of Michigan. Although 
Erigler, a conservative Republican with a farm background, had con 
siderable experience in state government, his election was unexpected. 
Many attributed his victory to the enthusiasm of his conservative sup 
porters and a "poor voter turnout" of Democrats in the Wayne County 
(Detroit) area, by far the largest concentration of voters in the state.
Among other things, Engler campaigned on a platform of welfare 
reform. With this goal in mind, one of the first controversial moves 
with respect to welfare changes was the elimination of the state-funded 
General Assistance (GA) program and it's employment program "Job 
Start." One of the justifications for the elimination of the GA program 
was that it was necessary in order to minimize cuts in the AFDC pro 
gram. The GA program focused on single welfare recipients, whereas 
AFDC was a "family-oriented" program. The welfare philosophy of 
the Engler administration was articulated in the document, "To 
Strengthen Michigan Families." This document became the cohesive 
philosophic element in the evolution of the Michigan JOBS program.
But the story of the changes in the implementation of the federal 
JOBS program does not result from these political changes alone. 
Michigan was, after all, in the midst of a serious recession at the time 
of these political changes. The opportunity for a dramatic shift in
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demands on welfare recipients with respect to JOBS programmatic 
options was limited by the high unemployment rate and the limitations 
of the state fiscal ability to meet the federal JOBS match. Thus, it 
appeared to us that the major changes in the AFDC employment pro 
gram focused on such things as getting waivers for greater earned 
employment limits and restructuring the daycare program that had seri 
ous administrative problems. So in the second year of this review of the 
implementation of the JOBS program, the emphasis of the Michigan 
MOST program was still on (1) education as the primary activity of the 
participants; and (2) priority in serving participants being given to vol 
unteers, the self-initiated, and those without high school completion. It 
should be noted that while the educational activities included both 
adult education through the k-12 program and postsecondary educa 
tion, the latter activity was classified as "self-initiated," since postsec 
ondary education was not a component in the MOST plan. Tuition was 
not paid. Moreover, although clear patterns in terms of treatment of the 
participants emerged among the individualized sites in the study, there 
was no real dictated state policy for client flow except for those partici 
pants who fell under the federal policy with respect to age and lack of 
high school completion.
Then during the second year or so of this study, the Michigan 
MOST program developed a program to utilize the state's existing edu 
cational institutional structure, including its highly developed system 
of publicly paid adult education; this program became eligible for 
compensation under the federal JOBS program. Moreover, the state 
was willing to appropriate additional education funds for this program 
called EDGE.
EDGE projects represented a holistic approach to the education and 
employment barriers faced by MOST participants who did not have a 
high school diploma, providing an array of services, such as assess 
ment, job readiness, customized basic education, customized skills 
training, job placement, and often transportation to classes and on-site 
child care. While the results of the EDGE program were somewhat 
mixed, in some counties it was clearly a success in meeting the needs 
of many hard-to-serve MOST participants, such as those in Port Huron, 
a rural county in the "Thumb" area of Michigan. The results of a small 
study indicated considerable success with the program as exceeding its 
goals in some cases in terms of education and employment outcomes.
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It was even successful in recruiting women for the nontraditional 
Building Trades Technician program, which placed its participants at 
the highest wage rate.
The EDGE program was said to be too costly and was eliminated in 
order to use funds for the most significant programmatic change in 
Michigan's welfare/employment program: Work First, a program as its 
name implies, that focuses on immediate employment as opposed to 
education and training.
Another important development in the evolution of Michigan's cur 
rent welfare/employment program was the implementation of a con 
cept called the "Social Contract." The Social Contract stipulated that if 
welfare recipients were to receive benefits from the government they 
had a contractual obligation to do something for those benefits. Thus 
recipients were to sign a contract that they would do at least 20 hours a 
week of some meaningful activity of betterment, including such things 
as volunteering, going to school, working, or engaging in certain health 
or nutritional activities for their family.
The Social Contract is now a mandatory part of the Michigan pro 
gram. It represents a significant departure from the JOBS implementa 
tion program as we first viewed it. In fact, it was at first voluntary and, 
in a sense, it seemed more of a substitute for the federal program. 
Moreover, unlike the EDGE program, which was extremely costly, the 
Social Contract did not involve contracting with outside agencies and 
was relatively cheap to administer.
Another important undertone about the MOST program developing 
in mid-1993 was that it was taking on more of a mandatory tone (even 
though technically participation had always been mandatory). When 
we first began reviewing the program, the "20-hour rule," the federally 
mandated requirement that JOBS participants be involved in program 
activities for at least 20 hours per week, was understood by administra 
tors and caseworkers in only one of the Michigan sites. Even at the 
state level, administrators seemed to be looking the other way. Later, 
however, along with the notion of 20-hours in an activity under the 
Social Contract, the 20 hours rule for regular MOST/JOBS participants 
was being emphasized and noted in agreements with subcontractors. 
EDGE participants frequently exceeded those hours.
Beyond the 20 hour rule, the MOST program took on a more puni 
tive tone as it became the "punishment" for those who did not fulfill
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their Social Contract. In other words, those recipients not complying 
with the Social Contract became a priority group for the MOST pro 
gram. So the notion of self-initiating into MOST began to diminish. 
Also, in interviews conducted at the state and local sites, we found the 
sanction process being taken more seriously than during the first phase 
of our study.
Why then if Michigan's implementation of the JOBS programs was 
as good, if not better than, that of the majority of the other states in our 
study and already had a higher than average percentage of AFDC 
recipients employed, did Michigan change its modus operandi? Gover 
nor Engler, in a February 1994 address to the National Press Club on 
"Welfare Reform," focused on the Michigan Model, which emphasizes 
employment for welfare recipients, noting that over 25 percent of 
Michigan's AFDC recipients were employed compared with about 10 
percent nationally. In part the answer seems to lie in the political phi 
losophy of the Governor's office, especially with his second election 
looming. The "get tough on welfare" stance and the elimination of 
General Assistance had brought considerable national recognition to 
Governor Engler. Now there were further political criticisms by con 
servatives in Michigan of the length of time welfare people were 
spending in education particularly higher education. The Governor 
preached the philosophy that people could go to school at night, i.e., 
work and go to school on their own. This notion too had considerable 
public appeal. So the program philosophy began to move from one of 
education support to early employment advocation.
But often overlooked in the analysis of the programmatic change in 
Michigan is the change in the Michigan economy. The condition of the 
Michigan economy, with its above-average degree of cyclically, 
changed dramatically over the period of this study. In November 1994, 
Michigan's unemployment rate was 4.6 percent, the lowest in over 
twenty years. In contrast, at one point in the early 1990s, with its 
unemployment rate slightly over 10 percent, Michigan was one of the 
greatest labor surplus states in the United States. For a number of 
months in the late 1994-95 period, the unemployment rate had been at 
or below the national average, with employers complaining of worker 
shortages.
So a strategic development in late 1994 was that a new program, 
Work First, would become a part of the state's solution to the labor
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shortage situation. Welfare recipients would be turned over to the JTPA 
offices to be given job readiness classes, job search, and employment 
as quickly as possible (a minimum of a 30-day test of the job market). 
The welfare program was to be a part of the state's economic develop 
ment strategy. This strategy highlights the change that occurred from 
a program that focused on the needs and wants of the welfare recipient, 
(e.g., self-initiated programs) to one that focuses on the employer's 
labor needs for economic development. In traditional welfare and 
employment/training programs, the recipient is viewed as the "client" 
or "customer"; in economic development programs, the employer, i.e., 
the firm, is typically viewed as the client. One hopes that there is a syn- 
ergistic relationship between the two goals and client groups.
Finally, it should be noted that one of the administrative actions of 
Governor Engler, which took place early in 1994 and which contrib 
uted to the economic development thrust of the welfare program, was 
the institution of the "Michigan Jobs Commission." It was at first a 
temporary agency, but has recently become a formal agency, the last 
one allowed by Michigan's constitution.
From eight different units of state government, the Michigan Jobs 
Commission consolidated staff and 35 programs related to job genera 
tion and worker preparation. One effect of the consolidation was that 
the Michigan Jobs Commission, which now also included JTPA, 
assumed much of the JOBS responsibility for employment and training 
services, taking this role out of the welfare agencies. While the action 
was indicative of the Engler administration's taste for consolidation 
and block grants in the employment and training area, it may also have 
been an attempt to change the culture of the program, as in Massachu 
setts. Robert D. Behn, in Leadership Counts: Lessons for Public Man 
agers (1991) gives a vivid account of how Governor Dukakis of 
Massachusetts and his appointees in the welfare agency changed the 
attitudes and behaviors of caseworkers so they strongly motivated 
recipients to prepare for work and seek employment.
However, it should be noted that even without block grants, Gover 
nor Engler and Department of Social Services Director Miller were 
able to make a series of changes to focus more attention on the 
employment-based nature of the welfare program. A strong and coher 
ent document early on presented a strategic vision for welfare reform.
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Besides, Engler was able to gain national visibility with his welfare 
policy; there were political rewards to taking a tough stance on welfare. 
The state of the economy has a considerable impact on the effective 
ness of not only work-based welfare programs in general, but also on 
the choice of program model: human capital investment or job search/ 
job placement. Early findings from the JOBS evaluation being per 
formed by MDRC in the early 1990s show that Grand Rapids, Michi 
gan was successful in increasing average earnings and reducing 
welfare expenditures by using a job search model. But the welfare 
agency in Grand Rapids is atypical. First, administrators were proud 
enough of their program to volunteer to participate in the MDRC eval 
uation. Second, sites for the evaluation were limited to agencies with 
mature programs. Third, Grand Rapids operates a mandatory program, 
as indicated by its sanctioning rate, which is the highest in the state. 
The strength of conservative Republicans in the area permits and may 
even explain this. Finally, the economy of Grand Rapids is unusually 
robust for Michigan, even in periods of high unemployment, so that job 
search is likely to be a more effective strategy than in some other parts 
of the state.
Lessons from the Implementation Study
Ample evidence has accumulated that welfare agencies are capable 
of operating programs that increase employment and reduce welfare 
expenditures by an amount exceeding program costs. The benefits of 
these programs are not uniformly greater than their costs, however, 
with the net benefits varying considerably according to the particular 
program and the characteristics of recipients. Also, programs appear to 
be more effective in reducing welfare costs than in increasing total 
family income and reducing poverty. Finally, the evidence of positive 
net benefits comes primarily from evaluations of job search and work 
experience programs rather than education programs, where benefits 
accrue over a longer time period and are not yet apparent from on 
going evaluations (Gueron and Pauly 1991; LaLonde 1995). For these 
reasons, the payoffs to the individual components of the JOBS pro 
gram remain uncertain.
Even if the technology for designing effective programs were under 
stood with greater certainty, the challenge of implementing successful
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programs would remain. The ten-state study contains some good news 
in this regard: the supply of education, training, and employment ser 
vices expands readily with increased funding. But there are challeng 
ing financial, political, and interorganizational tasks that must occur in 
order for implementation to take place as planned. In addition, welfare 
administrators must be willing and able to make changes internal to the 
welfare agency, such as creating an environment in which caseworkers 
effectively motivate recipients to get off welfare. Although some state 
officials, such as those in Michigan, have implemented JOBS with 
gusto, directives and financial incentives from Washington have been 
insufficient to guarantee that all states renegotiate the Social Contract 
to demand an obligation by welfare recipients.
The efforts of the 104th Congress to impose time limits and block 
grants can be viewed as a brute force way to motivate state leaders and 
welfare agencies to implement successful programs and to motivate 
recipients to take advantage of them and join the workforce. Will such 
a tough approach achieve its purpose? The answer depends on several 
factors. First, a time limit on welfare presumes that sufficient jobs are 
available to absorb people who loose their eligibility for welfare. 
Recent research indicates that the economy is generating jobs for low- 
skilled workers, particularly women, so that the availability of jobs per 
se is strong. The more serious problem will be the low wages paid by 
these jobs and the poor prospects for advancement into middle-income 
employment (Blank 1995). Substantial government spending on child 
care, health care, and wage supplements like the Earned Income Tax 
Credit will continue to be necessary if many of these families are to 
remain at their current level of well-being. So while more people may 
work, the cost to government may not fall in states concerned with 
poverty among families with children.
Second, the implementation study illustrates the political dynamic 
around welfare reform. Strong leadership has been visible in the states 
recently, but the direction of leadership has been less toward aggres 
sively implementing the JOBS program and more toward reforms that 
limit welfare eligibility and benefits and condition benefits on certain 
behavior. This suggests that governors and welfare commissioners pre 
fer to take the initiative in seeking welfare reform rather than respond 
to mandates imposed by the federal government. When federal legisla 
tion of the early 1980s gave states the option to operate new welfare
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employment programs, many state leaders were enthusiastic in design 
ing a new program and taking ownership of their creation. But when 
federal legislation required states to implement the JOBS program, 
consisting of services that many states were already providing, JOBS 
became just another federal mandate requiring program changes and 
additional expenditures. Rather than devoting political capital to 
increasing expenditures for the JOBS program, some state leaders 
chose to restrict welfare eligibility and benefits as a way of generating 
political capital. One state welfare commissioner explained that offi 
cials stand to benefit from this tough approach because "the public 
blames the welfare system for problems in their own life." At low cost 
to the majority of voters, a hard-line stance on welfare policy offers 
state leaders and Congress an easy opportunity for political gain.
Yet if state leaders are actually faced with time limits and block 
grants, their political calculus may change. They may no longer be able 
to attribute their welfare problems to federal mandates and will instead 
be responsible for devising and implementing ways to spread limited 
funds to feed, house, and clothe poor children. Unless they are willing 
to be accountable for an increase in the number of destitute and home 
less children, which we optimistically believe is unlikely, their oppor 
tunities for creating political capital at the expense of poor mothers and 
children will be exhausted or at least reduced. Instead, they may once 
again turn to the federal government for financial help and accept the 
accompanying strings. As shown by the implementation study, they 
will also be creative in complying with the federal mandates that 
remain. So although time limits and block grants will increase the pres 
sure on states to prepare welfare recipients for work and move them 
into the labor force and to discourage women and girls from bearing 
children they cannot support we do not view them as stable policies 
that will persist over time. Welfare has been reformed about every five 
years, in 1967, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1988. If the 104th Congress 
makes sweeping changes, they may well be reversed when the next 
recession raises welfare rolls and reduces state revenues.
NOTES
1 The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation is evaluating the JOBS program in 
seven sites using random assignment to a control group to measure the effectiveness of alternative
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programmatic approaches Preliminary findings from this evaluation are presented in Frudman 
and Fnedlander 1995
2 The sample of states was selected to provide diversity in several characteristics: per capita 
personal income, poverty rate, the level of fiscal stress expected in 1990, the structure of public 
assistance administration (i e, administration by the state government or by local government 
under state supervision), prior experience in operating a welfare employment program, and geo 
graphic region.
3. Hagen and Lune (1992), Lune and Hagen (1993), and Hagen and Lune (1994). Funding for 
the study was provided by The Pew Charitable Trusts, the U.S Departments of Labor and Health 
and Human Services, the New York State Department of Social Services, and the Foundation for 
Child Development Irene Lune served as the project's co-principal investigator, Colletta Moser 
as the field associate for Michigan.
4 The federally mandated participation rate for AFDC-UP families, two-parent families 
whose principal wage-earner is unemployed, is 40 percent in 1994 and rises to 75 percent by 
1997. In 1994, only nine states achieved a 40 percent rate of participation.
5. The success of the JOBS program in Riverside, California is frequently cited as an example 
where "organizational culture" positively affects program effectiveness. MDRC GAIN Evalua 
tion.
6 We also found that implementing work experience programs was costly and infrequently 
used The time needed for site development and monitoring of these positions was more than most 
welfare agencies could afford
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